











Vancouver’s  Port  is  Canada’s  biggest.  On  January  1,  2008,  it  got  bigger  ‐ 
restructuring  the  Port  of  Vancouver,  the  Fraser  River  Port  Authority  and  the 
North  Fraser  Port  Authority,  into  a  single  Vancouver  Fraser  Port  Authority, 
marketed (as of June, 2008) as Port Metro Vancouver.1 This new entity was the 




major  port  consolidation  ‐  and  governmental  responses  to  ensure  Vancouver 





large and  small were established and came under  the purview of  the Government of Canada. 














involved  ownership/management  by  port  commissions  under  the  aegis  of  the  federal 
government.  









divestiture  program  –  started  in  1996  ‐  by  the  end  of  2006,  Canada  had  ‘transferred,  de‐
proclaimed or  terminated  its  interest  in 466 of  the 549 ports  identified  for  such divestiture7 – 
under what  began  as  the  federal  government’s National Marine  Policy  of  1995  and  the  Ports 
Divestiture Plan, 1996 and later which became the National Marine Act (NMA) of June 1998.  By 
December, 2008, 472 of the 549 Ports Programs facilities “had been transferred, demolished or 
had  had  their  public  harbour  status  terminated.”8    For  many  of  the  remaining  ports  across 
Canada,  especially  smaller  ones,  the  holdup  often  has  been  one  of  First  Nations  claims  or 
questions  about  responsibility  for  ongoing  liabilities  –  either  of  these  creating  a  hiatus  in 
finalizing  the  remainder  of  the  federal  port  divestiture  plans.  Port  Stanley,  on  Lake  Erie  in 
Ontario is a good example of the latter: in Port Stanley, prior oil/fuel and other contamination of 
the soil at the port left key questions about who would be responsible for any remediation. The 
Transport  Canada  plan  had  been  to  divest  Port  Stanley  to  the Municipality  of  Central  Elgin  – 
along with  any  future  environmental  liability.  However,  the municipality  was  told  that  under 
tough new Ontario provincial environmental regulations it would be responsible for millions of 
dollars in cleanup costs related to leachate and drinking water contamination, etc. Indeed a ‘full 
remediation’  vs.  to  less  onerous  ‘industrial  standards’  would  be  necessary  for  any  new  non‐
federal owner.  Port Stanley remains one of the ‘non‐divested’ ports of Canada as a result.9   
The early  roots of  the push  for more market competition and the National Marine Act can be 
found in the work of the MacPherson Royal Commission on Transportation (1958 ‐ 1961) which 
considered the government’s control over transportation and “industry structure, conduct and 
performance”  and  advocated  inter‐modal  competition  amongst  Canada’s  transportation 
systems,  systematic  de‐regulation  of  rate  setting  and  the  use  of  national  transportation 
infrastructure to further the country’s economic success.10 The Commission’s findings ultimately 
led  to  the  passage  of  the National  Transportation  Act  (1967),  which  set  out  a  new  national 
transportation policy.11 What MacPherson had recommended was maximizing efficiency across 
the Canadian transportation system with more competition via market mechanisms: 






The  National  Transportation  Act  of  1967  contained  this  move  to  market  principles.  This 
legislative action was followed in the early 1980’s by the Canada Ports Corporation Act (1983), 
moving ports  to Crown Corporation  –  and more  arms‐length  –  status.13  In  1996,  the Chretien 
Liberal Government initiated the Ports Divestiture Plan. Initially, a six‐year program to eliminate 






tape,  and  greater  efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  the  marine  transportation  sector.”  The  Act 
called  for  a  shift  in  the  “financial  burden  of  marine  transportation  to  the  system  users,  a 
reduction  in  excess  infrastructure,  and  [to]  place  facility  operations  in  the  hands  of  local 
users.”15 Under the NMA, Ports shifted from their federal crown corporation status (under the 




Through  the  NMA,  the  federal  government  sought  the  “achievement  of  local,  regional  and 
national  social  and  economic  objectives  and  (to)  promote  and  safeguard  Canada’s 
competitiveness  and  trade  objectives.”18  The  government  cited  “over‐capacity  and 
inefficiencies”  in the system as  justification for removing the control of the Ports from Canada 












divested, demolished or have  their public harbour status  terminated. At  the end of  fiscal year 
2004‐2005,  fully  459 (84 per cent)  of  the  549  public  ports  and  public  port  facilities  had 
completed the Port Divestiture Program. 22  
The  Port  Divestiture  Program  has  followed  a  “land  and  chattels  transfer  strategy”  to  ensure 
certain federal benefits: 














b.  Local  interests  then  form a  legal entity, which  signs a non‐binding  Letter of 
Intent  to  negotiate  the  port  transfer  and  a  legally  binding  Disclosure  of 
Information  Agreement  with  Transport  Canada  to  protect  third  –  party 
information. 
c.  Transport  Canada  provides  the  local  entity  with  financial  data,  traffic  or 












The  NMA  underwent  a  mandatory  five  year  review  in  2003;  this  resulted  in  a  set  of 
recommendations encompassed in Bill C‐61 which was introduced in Parliament (by the Martin 
Liberal Government)  in  June  2005,  in  order  to    “fine‐tune  the  existing  provisions  and provide 
Canada Port Authorities (CPAs) with access to federal funding for certain infrastructure projects 
(to  a  capped  amount)  and  national  security.”  This  Act  died  on  the  order  paper  in November, 
2005 with the federal election ‘call’.26 
Canadian governments – both Liberal and Conservative ‐ undertook this systematic divestiture 
program  of  Canada’s  ports  beginning  in  the  mid‐1990’s  passing  off  ownership  and/or 






The  Port  remains  under  the  ownership  of  the  Crown;  while  operations  have  been  divested,  
ownership has not.  
The  VPA  was  an  interesting  example  of  the  shift  to  New  Public  Management  whereby  an 
appointed  Board  of Directors  became  responsible  for  the  overall management  and  long  term 












of  coastline  ranging  from  Roberts  Bank  at  the  U.S.‐Canada  border,  along  the  south  shore  of 
Burrard Inlet, up Indian Arm and the north shore of Burrard Inlet. The Authority oversaw 6,000 
hectares  of  water  and  460  hectares  of  land  occupied  primarily  by  cargo  terminals. 
















foreign  vessel  arrivals.  The  majority  of  exports  from  the  Port  emanated  from  the 
Western/Prairie  provinces  and  –  consistent  with  the  Asia  Pacific  Gateway  Initiative  – 
overwhelmingly went to Asia (66%), as well as to Latin/South America (13%) and Europe (11%). 
These exports primarily consisted of natural resources including coal (25 million tonnes), grains 
(8.4  million  tones),  wood  pulp  (4.3  million  tonnes),  sulphur  (6.1  million  tones),  potash  (5.9 
million tonnes), chemicals (2.2 million tones), and petroleum (1.2 million tones).31 
The Port also developed a cruise ship business as the home port for the Vancouver‐Alaska cruise 
route.  In 2005,  just under one million  (910,172) passengers on 33  cruise  ships  from 16  cruise 
lines used  the Port on 272  sailings  to/from  the Port  generating $1.4 billion  in economic  input 
and $2 million per sailing to the local and regional economies of British Columbia.32 
Historically,  the  Port  of  Vancouver  has  represented  Canada’s  Pacific  Gateway:  in  1987,  for 
example,  five  of  the  top  ten  destinations  of  Port  of  Vancouver  exports  were  to  Asia  Pacific 








Globalization  and  competitiveness  concerns,  as  noted  in  Section  I  above,  had  pushed  federal 
authorities and the Port to conclude that as big as the Port of Vancouver was, market advantage 
would  improve  if  it was made  even  bigger.  This  occurred  in  January,  2008, when  the  Port  of 
Vancouver was  amalgamated with  the  two other  significant  regional  river  Ports of  Fraser  and 











Port  Metro  Vancouver’s  main  sectors  include  maritime  cargo  (generating 
$2.2Billion  in wages)  and  the  cruise  ship  industry  (providing  5,700  direct  jobs 
and @ $200Million in payroll.  Cargo value annually is now at $75Billion 
Port  Metro  Vancouver  provides  45,000  regional  jobs  in  Greater  Vancouver 
(3,000 in Delta, 5,600 on the North Shore and over 20,000 in Vancouver) 
Port  Metro  Vancouver  generates  just  under  a  $1billion  ($970Million)  in  tax 
revenues  to  all  levels  of  government  annually    ‐  including  $657Million  to  the 
Feds 
The Port also anticipates $4.5Billion in new infrastructure/building over the next 
10  years  –  and  capital  spending  of  $95Million  annually  plus  Port  partner/user 
partner spending 
Port Metro Vancouver is Canada’s largest and North America’s most diversified 



















provincial  and  federal  governments  and  approved  by  the  Minister  of  Transport.    The  VPA’s 
Board  first  met  on  March  1,  1999,  on  a  day  the  VPA  called  an  “auspicious  and  promising 
beginning.”37  The  Authority  was  a  non‐shareholder,  for‐profit  corporation  governed  by  the 
Board which appoints a President to oversee day to day operations. The Board of Directors also 




of  property,  the  amount  of money  it  could  borrow  and  on  governance  issues.  Under  Letters 
Patent, the Authority paid the federal government a stipend based on a percentage of its gross 
revenue,  in  2005  this  amounted  to  close  to  $4 million.39  Supplementary  Letters  Patent  were 
routinely granted  in order to  facilitate Port expansion, changes  in governance, borrowing  limit 






The  Board  of  Directors  has  exerted  considerable  control  over  the  Port  since  divestiture; 
however,  the  Board  identified  several  issues  that  remained  to  be  improved  concerning  the 
relationship  between  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Authority.  The  Authority  specifically 
argued for changes in the following areas as part of the CMA five year review in 2003:  
1. Lowering borrowing costs – the VPA suggested that through utilization of private sector 
investment,  using  such  tools  as  tax‐exempt  bonds,  port  authorities  would  have  the 
ability to lower borrowing costs. 
2. Retention of Proceeds from the Sale of Port Lands – the VPA argued for the setting up of 






that  increased  investment  at  the  local  level would  occur  if  user  fees  collected  by  the 
Port  were  allowed  to  be  re‐invested  locally  rather  than  port  authorities  having  to 
remunerate a percentage of fees collected by the port to the federal government.41 
The VPA was  largely  supportive of  the  findings emanating  from the  five year  review  (released 
June  4,  2003)  viewing  them  as  “extremely  positive.”  Many  of  the  wholesale  changes  to  the 
Canada  Marine  Act  called  for  by  the  VPA  have  not  occurred  because  the  initial  enabling 
legislation  (Bill  C‐61) died on  the order paper  in November,  2005.    The VPA has  continued  to 
lobby  for  legislative action  to  implement  the  recommendations of  the  review panel.42 Despite 
the  lack  of wholesale  legislative  action,  specific  VPA  initiatives  regarding  financing  have  been 
undertaken  through  the  Supplementary  Letters  Patent  process,  however,  the  current  Harper 
government  is  still  reviewing  the  CMA  as  it  considers  the  future  of  marine  transportation  in 
Canada.43 In the interim, completing the Port Divestiture plan continues as the policy norm into 
2009. 
In  the  VPA’s  1999  Annual  Report  David  Stowe,  the  first  Chairman  of  the  Vancouver  Port 
Authority,  called  the    divestiture  of  the  Port  of  Vancouver  “seamless,”  however,  there  were 
issues  raised  particularly  by  the  City  of  Vancouver  and  other  local  stakeholders  throughout 
divestiture that needed to be addressed and/or are still being addressed on an ongoing basis.  
      Specifically, the City of Vancouver had reservations about divestiture in four main areas: 







than grants‐in‐lieu of property  taxes. Council  feared a  loss of  revenue and questioned 
whether  an  appropriate  fee  structure  could  be  determined  and  ultimately  collected 
under  the  new  system.  Framing  this  area  of  concern  was  the  Port’s  historic  lack  of 
promptness in the annual payment of grants‐in‐lieu of property taxes. 
• Local  Representation  on  and  Accountability  of  the  Port’s  Board  of  Directors  ‐    City 
council was  apprehensive  that  the new governance  structure  of  the  Port  consisted of 
only  one  municipal  representative  and  argued  that  in  order  to  maintain  community 
input and local accountability a minimum of five municipal representatives should be in 
place on the Board. 
• Land Use and Development – Council recognized the historical          cooperation on land 




Former  City Manager  (and  subsequent  Deputy  to  the  BC  Premier)  Ken  Dobell,  in  a  report  to 
Vancouver Council, labeled the relationship between the Port and City of Vancouver as “varied”, 
identifying land use issues as being an ongoing source of friction. Dobell supported the idea of 
formalizing  the  relationship  between  the  City  and  Port  in  a  manner  that  recognized  the 
independence of each jurisdiction and responsibilities of both entities. 45 The desire to enter into 
a  more  formal  relationship  between  the  Port  and  City  resulted  in  the  signing  of  the  Port  of 
Vancouver/City  of  Vancouver  Charter  which  sought  to  identify  areas  of  common  interest,  to 









e) provision  of  effective  road  and  rail  access  and  utility  services  for  the 
efficient operation of the Port  
f) provision of access to water for necessary city utility services  
g) provision  of  effective  policing  and  emergency  services  in  the  Port  and 





The  City  of  Vancouver/Vancouver  Port  Authority  Charter  formed  the  backbone  of  the 
City/Authority relationship since divestiture and has resulted  in consultative processes such as 
those  currently  surrounding  East  Vancouver  Port  lands  development.  Several  other  bordering 
municipalities have also entered into Charter arrangements with the Port with the overarching 
intention  of  mitigating  any  possibility  of  negative  relationships  developing  between  the  Port 
Authority and its neighbours.48 In many cases, municipal – and public – access to the waterfront 
is a central local concern.49 This often ran counter to Port development plans. 
Under  the  CMA,  the  Port  has  the  “authority  and  responsibility  to  approve  development 
proposals  for  its  lands”,  while  under  provincial  law  the  City  has  “authority  to  approve 
development  applications  on  any  lands  located  within  its  municipal  boundaries  that  are  not 
subject  to  Provincial  or  Federal  jurisdictions.”50  The  process  of  solving  municipal/port  issues 
since divestiture would have been much more difficult without the understandings contained in 
such Port/City Charter.  





























































First  Nations  –  several  – 




























uses  to  “get  around”.51  Meanwhile,  well  before  the  late  2008  economic  “correction”,  the 
provincial  government,  together  with  the  feds,  had  been  working  to  counter  this  regional 







11‐year  construction  project  (2010‐2021)  was  to  “build  BC’s  economic  competitiveness  by 
streamlining  the movement of goods and people and ensuring  that we can  tap  into  the  trade 
opportunities with the Asia‐Pacific…. (It  is) part of BC’s Gateway Program and the Government 
of Canada’s Asia‐Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative.”53    
  As  the  same  Vancouver‐area  announcement,  Canada’s  Prime  Minister  emphasized  the 
increased “efficiency through Canada’s Asia‐Pacific Gateway and Corridor” – an initiative started 
by the feds  in October, 2006.54 The Prime Minister noted that the BC’s contribution to various 
components  of  this  Gateway was  $3Billion.55    The  APGCI  is  to  “bring  together  infrastructure, 
policy, governance and operational  issues  in an  integrated,  intermodal, public‐private  strategy 
to  strengthen  Canada’s  competitive  position  in  international  commerce  with  the  Asia  Pacific 


























questions  about  First Nation  relations,  even  claims  to ownership/title.  The  influence of  actual 
and  potential  land  claims  and  treaty  negotiations  during  the  ongoing  implementation  of  Port 
divestiture and consolidation in Vancouver is a case in point.  
A  local  example  of  First  Nation  influence  is  the  current  relationship  between  Port  Metro 






Port  Authority  to  court  seeking  compensation  for  development  of  Roberts  Bank  and  planned 
future  expansion  of  the  container  facility.  In  2004,  the  then‐VPA  and  Tsawwassen  signed  a 
Memorandum of Agreement which compensated for “past infringements on the TFN’s claimed 
land and sought “compensation and mitigation” for any VPA future expansion that affected TFN 
land  which  effectively  settled  the  court  cases.  57    In  December,  2007,    the  Tsawwassen  First 
Nation, the Government of British Columbia and the Government of Canada signed a final treaty 
agreement  covering  taxation,  financial  compensation,  natural  resources,  fishery,  certainty, 
governance  and  (most  importantly  re:  Gateway)  lands.    As  the  FN  lands  are  adjacent  to  Port 
Metro  Vancouver’s  Deltaport  –  the  terminus  of  the  South  Fraser  Perimeter  Road  (+  rail) 
expansion  ‐  AND  much  of  this  same  land  has  been  subject  to  development  limits  via  the 







federal  government  to  collaborate  much  with  other  actors  aside  from  the  Vancouver  Ports 
Corporation  in  the  planning  and  decision‐making  and  initial  aspects  of  the  implementation 
stages  of  the  process  of  divestiture  to  consolidation.  The  macro‐goal  of  divestiture  (and 
subsequently  major  port  consolidation)  in  order  to  maximize  economic  benefit  was  a  policy 
developed over several federal governments since the MacPherson Commission in 1961. 
The  Federal  government,  the  Provincial  government,  the  City  of  Vancouver  (and  related 
municipalities)  and  the  port  authority  worked  together,  out  of  necessity,  to  facilitate  the 
expansion  of  the  port  as  part  of  the  Pacific  Gateway  Initiative  during  the  implementation 
phase.58  In  2005,  the  Province  provided  $2.5  million  in  property  tax  relief  for  port  terminal 
operators to encourage expansion efforts, $400 million in road infrastructure in support of the 
port  and  other  regional  transportation  modes  and  $2.5  million  in  funding  for  further 









decision‐making,  implementation of strategy and  future development  initiatives. The ability  to 
directly  act  without  seeking  permission  from  department  higher‐ups  on  every  issue  lessens 
bureaucratic entanglements and enhances the ability of the Port to act quickly in situations and 






President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer.  Amongst  the  new  CEO’s  duties  are  to  “continue  the 
pursuit of the Pacific Gateway Strategy, collaborate with governmental officials at all levels and 
promote a broader  commitment  to building  relations with neighbouring  communities.”61  That 
collaboration seems central to Port Metro Vancouver’s current vision.    In an 8‐page insert  into 
Vancouver’s  major  newspaper,  The  Vancouver  Sun,  the  Port’s  insert  title  was  simply: 
“Collaboration is key for Canada’s Pacific Gateway” – and an extensive description of what each 
of the three amalgamating ports brought to the table with consolidation. 
Port  Metro  Vancouver  remains  Canada’s  biggest  and  busiest  port.  It  is  a  central  part  of  the 
country’s Asia‐Pacific outreach. As Evans argues elsewhere in this volume, it is likely to remain a 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